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The transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe was marked by 
incertitude. After 1989, when euphoria already disappeared and the economic and 
social constraints begun to channel the specific evolutions of the countries in the 
region, it was clear that only the starting point was guaranteed, not the path or the 
ending point1. The economic gap is easier to explain by the economic centralization 
and by the varying performances2, and also by the strategies of state capital conversion 
and the foreign capital flows3. The ”new managerialism” and its economic interests 
shaped the openness of the economy and the transition to a capitalist economy4.
What makes the greatest difference is the openness of the political system 
toward a full competition, the proper functioning of state institutions and the 
respect of citizens’ fundamental rights and liberties. The states in the region gained 
differentiated access to several international and regional organizations as the Council 
of Europe, NATO and the European Union, but they differ a lot also in what regards 
the democratization process, whatever would be the democratization measure we 
choose5. The gap between post-communist countries widened so much that it was 
common to differentiate between groups of countries and ”waves” of accession to the 
European Union6. Since the economy is not sufficient to explain these gaps, a better 
explanation would be the cultural factors.
The cultural factor explanation generally focuses on values and habits of 
cooperation that bind people together. In the same time, cooperation under the 
large umbrella of voluntary associations is considered to be essential in providing 
participants with basic democracy tools. The small-scale cooperation would finally 
spill-over and forge large-scale cooperation, helping people combine political resources 
1  D. STARK, L. BRUSZT, Postsocialist Pathways. Transforming Politics and Property in East 
Central Europe, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998.
2  D. STARK, ”Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe”, East 
European Politics and Societies, vol. 6, no. 1, 1991, pp. 17-51.
3  D. STARK, B. VEDRES, ”Social Times of Network Spaces. Sequence Analysis of Network 
Formations and Foreign Investment in Hungary, 1987-2001”, paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, 2004.
4  G. EYAL, I. SZELÉNY, E. TOWNSLEY, Making Capitalism without Capitalists: The New 
Ruling Elites in Eastern Europe, Verso, London, 2001.
5  S. BERGLUND, K. DUVOLD, ”The Difficult Art of Measuring Support for Regimes. An 
Inventory and Evaluation of Democracy Criteria”, paper presented at the European Consortium 
for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops, Granada, 2005.
6  R. ROSE, ”A Diverging Europe”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 12, no. 1, 2001, pp. 93-106.
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in order to influence policy-making. The theory of voluntary associations as schools 
of democracy has been seriously challenged, by numerous measures and competing 
theories. We do this in transitions settings, which are much different from those of 
consolidated democracies, and compare the importance of competing factors for the 
support for democracy. We first assess the importance of the support for democracy in 
transition settings and deal with the problem of accurately measure this support. We 
then take into account various factors and compare their influence on the support for 
democracy. We finally conclude by discussing the limited power for explanation that 
social capital holds in transition settings in Romania.
This article investigates what explains the support for democracy? and argues 
that what differentiates countries in the region could be institutions or democratic 
knowledge, beliefs, values and attitudes. In the process of transition, institutions are 
much easier to reshape than anything else. Dahrendorf considered that an institutional 
reform would be possible in one-year time, and under favorable conditions even 
in six months. Transforming economy would take longer, maybe six years1. The 
greatest effort to make and the longest process in time would be the change in 
political culture, from a dependent to a fully civic one. In fact, citizens’ commitment 
towards democracy is essential, and it should overpass a limited and instrumental 
commitment. The beliefs of political activists in the authority, legitimacy, efficiency 
and the prestige of democracy, emphasizes Dahl, are important conditions2. From 
this point of view, citizens’ characteristics are much more important that economic 
transformations and the institutional design. We therefore intend to measure the 
importance of several factors for democracy, and we emphasize cultural factors, 
grouped under the large label of social capital. Is social capital essential for the 
democratic foundations in Romania? Social capital is, certainly, credited with capacity 
of promoting a competent, participatory, civic citizen3. Should it be also responsible 
for the support for democracy? Does it explain more than other factors do, i.e. human 
capital, economic resources and civic attitudes, factors grouped by Rose and Weller4 
in the so called ”classical paradigm”?
In order to measure the importance of different factors for democracy, we use 
the data of a survey conducted in Romania in November 2005 at the Open Society 
Foundation’s request. We use these data in order to make Romania a fully comparable 
case, since this survey is part of World Values Survey (the wave 2005-2006), a larger 
inquiry conducted in no less than 50 countries. This way, we overcome serious concerns 
regarding the comparison between inquiries that use different questionnaires. At 
the same time, this survey is part of a larger project financed by the Open Society 
Foundation, namely the Public Opinion Barometer (POB), which makes comparison 
of data possible across time inside Romania. POB is a semesterly survey that covers a 
wide range of political and social issues in Romania. By using standard questionnaires, 
1  R. DAHRENDORF, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, Random House, New York, 
1990.
2  R.A. DAHL, Poliarchy. Participation and Opposition, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1971.
3  R.D. PUTNAM, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1993.
4  R. ROSE, C. WELLER, ”What Does Social Capital Add to Democratic Values?” , in 
G. BĂDESCU, E.M. USLANER (eds.), Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy, Routledge, 
New York, 2003, pp. 200-218.
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POB is a very suitable way of making sound comparisons with other surveys inside 
and outside Romania. The sample used is made up of 1776 respondents aged 18 years 
or older , and it is representative for the Romanian adult population, with a calculated 
error (by the author) of ± 2,3 %.
Support for democracy is measured by using a realistic definition of the regime, 
rather than an idealistic one. In the dispute between the two definitions of democracy, 
Mishler and Rose stress the superiority of the competitive definition1. It is worth to 
remember Dahl’s remark about the attachment to political regimes that are imperfect, 
but perfectible and deeply tolerant and human. The liberties promoted by democratic 
regimes often lose the charm, they lose their revolutionary charm. These liberties are 
more often taken for granted. But people, who lost them or never had such liberties, 
are much more thankful for. Romanian people did not enjoy for a long period of time 
the benefits of these liberties. Thus they have the historical experience enabling them 
to make a realistic evaluation of political regimes. We will therefore use in our analysis 
a democratic indicator that measures how strongly people reject some plausible 
undemocratic alternatives, and which expresses the attachment for democracy as a 
competitive regime.
Table 1
Attitudes Regarding the Undemocratic Alternatives (%)
How good would it be for Romania… Very good Good Bad Very bad DK/NA
To have a strong leader, who does not 
bother with Parliament and elections 28.9 36.8 12.9 5.4 16.0
That experts reach a decision, instead of 
government, as they consider to be the 
best decision for the country
22.6 37.6 14.9 3.8 21.1
To be ruled by a military regime 5.2 11.5 35.2 30.2 17.7
The democratic indicator we use is built up by adding the disagreement with 
the alternatives above. The three items make up a consistent scale, as measured 
by the reliability analysis (Crombach’s Alpha = 0,8106). Looking to the share of 
citizens accepting a strong leader, we may easily believe in a tendency in favor of 
authoritarianism. Yet we have to look to the three items together. There are only 16,9% 
of the respondents who do not reject any undemocratic alternative, whereas 48,2% 
reject a single alternative, 25,4% reject two alternatives and 9,4% reject all of them.
The social capital is the second variable considered. In the last decade, cultural 
factors have been considered as important factors for democracy. In this respect, 
social trust, reciprocity and altruism are ingredients of cooperation. And cooperation 
facilitates the development and growth of the political resources of individuals and 
groups, enabling them to influence the political system2. They could have important 
direct effects, by influencing the members of the groups, but also indirect effects, 
1  W. MISHLER, R. ROSE, ”Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: Realist vs. Idealist 
Theories and Measures”, International Political Science Review, vol. 22, no. 4, 2001, pp. 303-320.
2  G.A. ALMOND, S. VERBA, The Civic Culture, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1963.
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by influencing the political system. Through the process of cooperation, instead 
of isolated, distrustful and powerless individuals, one can find in society various 
organized civic groups that carry out specific actions of political communication 
(lobby, advocacy) and manage to control politicians in office. Such organized groups in 
civil society could force politicians to be more responsible, responsive and efficient by 
promising political support or by threatening with its withdrawal. Citizens’ response 
to responsible and responsive behavior of politicians is an even growing demand for 
political solutions. In the same time, this new demand is accompanied by citizens’ 
enforced satisfaction, trust and partisanship moderation. This favorable relationship 
between inputs and outputs within the political system, between critical citizens and 
effective policy-makers has been described as the virtuous circle of modern democracy. 
The opposite is easy to imagine, i.e. alienated citizens and irresponsible, corrupted 
and indolent political elites.
But which are those social institutions responsible for such favorable effects? The 
widespread answer is voluntary organizations. No matter their explicit or implicit 
political nature, they seem to yield desirable internal effects, i.e. participants get more 
oriented towards political system, more interested, competent and political efficacious1. 
The most important result is that citizens rely more on political cooperation under 
stressful circumstances. Cooperation is also favored by other effect that participation 
might have, as attitudes of trust and tolerance. The contact between individuals with 
different social background, people who differ in various ways (ethnicity, religion, 
language) fosters tolerance and lessens social conflicts. Some enthusiastic scholars 
even believe that such cooperation is in favor on many other phenomena, as education 
performance and even the reduction of antisocial actions and crimes2. Other scholars 
consider that self-rated health (or even health, for example) may be significantly 
related to social capital3.
Everybody did not accept the supposed relationship between participation in 
voluntary associations and democratic performance. For many scholars, this in not at 
all obvious, that participation produces the highly valued public and private goods. 
The relationship itself is contestable. According to Putnam4, voluntary associations 
do the job of ”bonding” and ”bridging” individuals and groups, and help them to 
overpass deep cleavages in society. The condition which Putnam considers essential 
is that these associations are completely apolitical. But this consideration raises a 
series of questions. If they are apolitical, how could these organizations favor political 
participation and civic engagement without engaging in specific political debates and 
without representing social interests? We must remember that civil society may be 
seen as a decisive counterweight to the state and a fearless opponent of the totalitarian 
state. If this is the case, than we have a paradox of the civil society, as emphasized by 
Edwards and Foley5. If civil society is strong enough to destroy authoritarian political 
order, which are the guarantees that democratic state will not be undermined? And 
1  Ibidem.
2  R.D. PUTNAM, ”Social Capital: Measurement and Consequences”, Isuma. Canadian 
Journal of Policy Research, vol. 2, no. 1, 2001, pp. 47-59.
3  G. VEENSTRA, ”Social Capital and Health”, Isuma. Canadian Journal of Policy Research, 
vol. 2, no. 1, 2001, pp. 72-81.
4  R.D. PUTNAM, ”Social Capital…cit.”.
5  B. EDWARDS, M.W. FOLEY, ”The Paradox of Civil Society”, Journal of Democracy, 
vol. 7, no. 3, 1996, pp. 38-52.
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why civil society should only be composed by peaceful groups and not by violent 
ones, as Mafia or Ku-Kluk-Klan? Without legitimate state coercion and rule, wouldn’t 
we experience an outburst of violent conflict between social groups? The same civil 
society that fights against a totalitarian state may be a threat for a democratic system, 
since it can push the government to adopt particular interests, standpoints and 
aspirations over the public goods. This kind of interests could obstruct society and 
government to respond to disadvantaged demands, making thus possible that these 
social blocks confront violently for the control of the state1. One should not disregard 
Olson’s argument, that a dense network of associations could sometimes become a 
burden for the fair functioning of states and markets2.
There are many other doubts about the importance of voluntary activity, namely 
about the effects on other significant variables for the democratic process. Participation 
in voluntary organizations is commonly seen as related to the interpersonal trust, 
while the latter is important for cooperation. Even if there are confirmations regarding 
the relationship between voluntary participation and trust3, many scholars continue 
to be skeptical. The correlation between the two variables one can find in various 
surveys may be the consequence of a selective recruitment of the participants in 
secondary organizations. Their members are exactly those who trust other people, 
whereas people who display less trust are not to be found between the members of 
such organizations4. Even when one can find a positive correlation between variables, 
the relationship is statistically weak. Newton discovered that it is rather inconsistent 
at aggregate level. Even in theory, emphasizes Newton, there are few arguments in 
favor of this relationship: the time one spends in the organization is incomparably 
shorter than that spent in other socializing environments, as family, school, workplace 
or neighborhood. Secondly, there are other factors that already proved important for 
trust and civic engagement, e.g. the education5. Therefore, the political support for 
democracy might not come from participation in voluntary organizations, and the 
political and economic performance of government might be more important that 
usually expected6.
It is already a known fact that the level of social capital in Central and Eastern 
Europe is lower than in Western societies7. But different scholars explain differently the 
gap between societies. There is no doubt that Central and Eastern European countries 
differ from the Western countries in respect to their recent past. Whether one does 
1  R. SCIARRONE, ”Réseaux mafieux et capital social”, Politix , vol. 13, no. 49, 2000, 
pp. 35-56.
2  M. OLSON, The Rise and Decline of Nations. Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social 
Rigidities, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982.
3  D. WOLLEBAEK, P. SELLE, ”Does Participation in Voluntary Associations Contribute 
to Social Capital? The Impact of Intensity, Scope, and Type”, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 1, 2002, pp. 32-61.
4  K. NEWTON, ”Social Capital and Democracy in Modern Europe”, in J. van DETH (ed.), 
Social Capital and European Democracy, Routledge, London, 1999, pp. 3-24.
5  G.A. ALMOND, S. VERBA, The Civic Culture, cit.
6  K. NEWTON, ”Political Support. Social Capital, Civil Society, and Political and Economic 
Performance”, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine, paper 06’07, 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/06-07, 2006.
7  G. BĂDESCU, ”Social Trust and Democratization in Post-communist Societies”, in 
G. BĂDESCU, E. M. USLANER (eds.), Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy, Routledge, 
New York, 2003, pp. 120-139.
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not consider trust as a psychological trait which may influence many aspects of late 
behavior1, than socializing conditions could be responsible for the cooperation and 
the commitment style of citizens. From this perspective, the actual social connections 
come from the general constrains of the communist system, based on tight ideological 
control and mobilization, deletion and repression. Distrust, social atomization, 
and loose cooperation could all originate in the kind of connections people had in 
communist times2.
Other factors explaining low levels of social capital in the region could be social 
and economic problems that citizens face. Struggling in transition, people hardly 
find time to spend in company of friends, and have no time at all to spend for non-
profit activities. Low levels of participation in secondary organizations could thus be 
explained by the lack of resources, and also by the disappointing experiences people 
had with communist forced mobilization, the persistence of informal cooperation 
networks and, finally, by the frustration caused by the performance of the new 
democratic and economic systems3.
The consent and support of citizens are important conditions for the future 
consolidation of democracy. And this is not only about an idealistic attachment to 
democracy. We don’t use an idealistic definition of democracy as the best form of 
government. It was already proved that the strongest attachment to democracy in 
idealistic terms can be found exactly where democracy performs badly, in countries 
one could hardly label as quasi-democracies4. The advice we take is to use a realistic 
definition of democracy, a competitive definition, which can compare democracy 
to plausible undemocratic alternatives5. This way, citizens could estimate the 
performance of a vivid regime, compared to past and well-known alternatives. As 
Sartori recalls, a terrible danger for democracy is the widespread correlation between 
unrealistic expectations of the citizens and the ideal traits of democracy6. The inevitable 
pessimism that arises from this occurrence is deeply undermining for democracy.
In the analysis, we use a definition of social capital that combines psychological 
traits, namely social trust, and structural features, as the density of networks of 
cooperation. The latter dimension is expressed by activism in different kind of 
voluntary associations and its indicator is built exactly by adding the participation in 
all sorts of associations (Crombach’s Alpha = 0,9554).
1  G.W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New 
York, 1961.
2  B. VÖLKER, H. FLAP, ”Weak Ties as a Liability. The Case of East Germany”, Rationality 
and Society, vol. 13, no. 4, 2001, pp. 397-428.
3  M.M. HOWARD, ”Why Post-Communist Citizens Do Not Join Voluntary Organizations”, 
in G. BĂDESCU, E.M. USLANER (eds.), Social Capital and the Transition…cit., pp. 165-183.
4  H.-D. KLINGEMANN, ”Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis”, in 
P. NORRIS (ed.), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 78-99.
5  R. ROSE, W. MISHLER, C. HAERPFER, Democracy and Its Alternatives. Understanding 
Post-Communist Societies, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1998.
6  G. SARTORI, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Chatham House, Chatham, 1987.
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Table 2
Participation in Voluntary Organizations (%)
Type of organization
Member (if the case) do 
voluntary (unpaid) 
activitiesActive Inactive Don’t belong to NA Yes No NA
Religious or church 
organization 5.3 4.4 90.1 0.2 42.2 42.2 15.6
Sports and recreation 1.0 1.0 97.9 0.2 14.3 45.7 40.0
Education, arts, music 1.1 0.7 98.0 0.2 21.9 46.9 31.3
Labor unions 3.8 2.8 93.2 0.2 18.5 81.5 ----
Political parties 2.5 1.3 96.0 0.2 44.4 55.6 ----
Ecological 0.2 0.5 99.2 0.2 25.0 25.0 50.0
Professional associations 1.2 0.5 98.1 0.2 26.7 23.3 50.0
Charitable organization 0.8 0.4 98.6 0.2 59.1 9.1 31.8
Consumer organizations 0.1 0.4 99.3 0.2 11.1 22.2 66.7
Other type 0.5 0.2 99.2 0.2 54.5 27.3 18.2
As we have stressed already, everybody does not agree with the definition of 
social capital. Following Coleman, the psychological traits are not part of it1. However, 
civic attitudes, as social trust, become more and more part of social capital’s definition. 
In our survey, only 19,3% of the respondents believe that one can trust other people, 
whereas 75,6% believe that one can’t be too careful in dealing with people. There are 
differences between Romania and other countries in the region, on one hand, and 
Western democracies, on the other hand. They could be real, yet they could come 
from the meaning of ”people”. Bădescu underlines that a better operationalization 
would be ethnic trust2. The difference is obvious when we ask about different kind of 
people, which may support Bădescu’s findings.
Table 3
Trust in Different Kinds of People (%)
How much do you trust the 
following kind of people
Very 
much Much
Not too 
much Not at all NA DK
Family 75.8 20.3 2.2 0.6 0.3 0.8
Relatives 26.4 52.0 17.5 3.3 0.3 0.6
Neighbors 8.3 40.6 38.9 10.8 0.8 0.7
People you know personally 5.7 48.5 34.1 7.7 2.7 1.2
People you meet for the first time 1.2 10.9 45.8 36.1 4.8 1.1
With other religion 2.1 25.0 40.7 20.8 9.9 1.6
With other nationality 2.2 23.2 40.8 20.7 11.4 1.8
1  J.S. COLEMAN, ”Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”, American Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 94, 1988, pp. 95-119.
2  G. BĂDESCU, ”Social Trust and Democratization…cit”.
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In the measuring of social capital we also include the norms of reciprocity 
(trustworthiness), though measuring such norms could prove much more difficult. 
These norms are related to individual selfish or altruist behaviors. The latter takes 
into account the consequences one’s actions could have on others, while the former 
does not. The items in table 4 express the agreement with the free-riding. The indicator 
built up by using these items is considered by van Schaik to be a proxy for the norms 
of reciprocity1. In fact, van Schaik closely follows Stolle and Rochon2, as well as Knack 
and Keefer3 in the operationalization.
According to Stolle and Rochon4, social capital expresses the willingness to 
participate to common duties. In an environment dominated by high levels on social 
capital, people expect less that others to free-ride and, therefore, they are themselves 
less motivated to free-ride. The authors expect members of associations to develop an 
ethnic condemning the free-riding when dealing with public goods and governmental 
policies. According to social capital theory, voluntary associations help participants to 
enlarge their interests and the definition of the self, turning ”I” into ”us” even when 
associations follow specific and private oriented interests. As van Schaik stresses, 
the cooperation that arises is therefore a proof that people put common interest in 
place instead of their selfish interests5. Knack and Keefer also consider that norms of 
reciprocity are defined by attitudes of cooperation with strangers in prisoner dilemma 
settings6. Civic cooperation is generated by the people’s willingness to cooperate 
when confronted to an issue related to collective action. That is why van Schaik7 uses 
the rejection of free-riding as a proxy for reciprocity norms, which are measured by the 
agreement with a series of sentences regarding different kinds of behavior, ranging on 
a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that such a behavior could never be justified, and 
10 means that it is always justified. The mean on the scale and the standard deviation 
are show below. Thus, we build an indicator of egoism by adding the following items 
(Crombach’s Alpha = 0,8057).
1  T. van SCHAIK, ”Social Capital in the European Values Study Surveys”, paper presented 
at the OECD-ONS International Conference on Social Capital Measurement, London, UK, 
2002.
2  D. STOLLE, T.S. ROCHON, ”Are All Associations Alike?: Member Diversity, 
Associational Type, and the Creation of Social Capital”, American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 42, 
no. 1,1998, pp. 47-65; D. STOLLE, T.S. ROCHON, ”The Myth of American Exceptionalism: A 
Three-nation Comparison of Associational Membership and Social Capital”, in J. van DETH, 
M. MARAFFI, K. NEWTON and P. WHITELY (eds.), Social Capital and European Democracy, 
Routledge, New York, 1999, pp. 192-209.
3  S. KNACK, P. KEEFER ”Does Social Capital Have an Economic Pay-off? A Cross-country 
Investigation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112, no. 4, 1997, pp. 1251-1288.
4  D. STOLLE, T.S. ROCHON, ”Are All Associations Alike?...cit.”.
5  T. van SCHAIK, “Social Capital in the European Values…cit.”.
6  S. KNACK, P. KEEFER ” Does Social Capital Have an Economic Pay-off?...cit”, p. 1258.
7  T. van SCHAIK, ”Social Capital in the European Values…cit.”.
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Table 4
Agreement with Free-riding Behavior
 
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether 
you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between, using this 1 to 10 scale
Mean Standard deviation
Claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to 2.04 2.05
Travel by bus/train without paying a ticket (free-riding) 2.01 1.94
Cheating on tax if you have the chance 2.34 2.48
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties 1.45 1.33
Except these features of social capital, we will take into account a so called ”diffused 
social capital”, defined by relationships which help individuals to integrate into the 
community, such as church attendance and the rural residence, but also confidence in 
state institutions. We follow in the analysis the extended model of social capital used 
by Rose and Weller in their study of the social capital in Russia1. The authors include 
in the definition of social capital some dimensions that are closer to the definition of 
James Coleman2, namely instrumental social networks that vary in different contexts. 
Thus the authors measure social capital by the instrumental benefits of joining social 
networks, i.e. the support people benefit of in stress settings, when they need someone 
outside their family to help them when getting ill or when they need consistent 
financial aid3. In fact, Russia is much similar to other communist countries in this 
respect4. In the analysis, we use an indicator of helpful social networks in order to 
indicate whether people have social connections they can use in hospitals, in courts of 
justice, in public administration, when dealing with lawyers and policemen or when 
they look for a workplace or a bank loan.
As stated above, accepting reciprocity norms reveals a disposition to privilege 
common interest, and therefore it could be seen as an altruism indicator. Another 
element of ”diffuse social capital” is trust in executive and authority institutions, e.g. 
the government, police, courts of justice and the army, and trust in representative 
institutions, e.g. the parliament, political parties, presidency and mayoralties. In fact, 
the connection between social and institutional trust is constantly debated. Whereas 
scholars like Norris5 consider the influence running from interpersonal to institutional 
trust, Brehm and Rahn6 depict the relationship as circular, while other scholars, like 
Newton7, question any relationship between the two types of trust.
1  R. ROSE, C. WELLER, ”What Does Social Capital Add to Democratic Values?”, cit.
2  J.S. COLEMAN, ”Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital…cit.”.
3  W. MISHLER, R. ROSE, ”What Are the Political Consequences of Trust? A Test of 
Cultural and Institutional Theories in Russia”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 38, no. 9, 2005, 
pp. 1050-1078.
4  B. VÖLKER, H. FLAP, “Weak Ties as a Liability…cit.”.
5  P. NORRIS, Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1999.
6  J. BREHM, W. RAHN, ”Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of 
Social Capital”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 41, no. 3, 1997, pp. 999-1023.
7  K. NEWTON, ”Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society and Democracy”, International Political 
Science Review, vol. 22, no. 2, 2001, pp. 201-214.
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Finally, social integration can be influenced by living in rural areas, as well as by 
the churchgoing. Both variables could have a different effect compared with that of 
living in cities, which is a place where different social interactions occur. Mishler and 
Rose often use these variables as proxies for socialization1.
Protest, as a distinct form of political participation, represented in the ’60s and 
‘70s a huge social surprise and generated a great controversy about its causes. Scholars 
began first to study protest in the Unites States, probably the most tranquil Western 
society after World War II, as Barnes observes2. Their interest was to determine 
the causes of change in public’s behavior, with the rise of different kind of social 
movements. Whereas the United States in the ‘50s only faced isolated violence related 
to specific work conflicts, they were later on confronted with new movements, such 
as peace meetings and rallies against the war in Vietnam, mass demonstrations in 
favor of black people, women and other social minorities.
There are two perspectives on protesters. Some scholars argue that are not 
basically different from other political participants, but rather similar to party 
members and civic volunteers. Thus protest is yet another form of participation. 
These scholars stress that protesters are also to be found in more conventional political 
actions3. Other scholars think that protesters are different. They do not participate to 
some more traditional political actions and do not vote as frequently. Moreover, in 
post-communist societies, protesters prove to be more dissatisfied with the ongoing 
transition and consider more often that political and economic systems fail to respond 
to citizen’s demands4. In conclusion, they are different from their colleagues who 
protest in the streets of Brussels, Paris, Hamburg or London.
The rise in protest in Western countries was largely related to the general change 
in social conditions, to the growing emphasis on post-material values and then to an 
attitudinal change towards politics and political institutions5. Could this be the case 
in Romania? According to Uslaner6, protest in Romania and other similar societies in 
the region may rather express people’s discontent with the general social conditions. 
Whereas conventional participation, as voting and party membership, represents the 
support for the political regime, protest represents discontent and frustration. Likewise 
in Western societies, protesters may prove more discontent with democracy7. We 
measure protest by citizens’ past involvement in such activities as signing a petition, 
1  W. MISHLER, R. ROSE, ”Political Support for Incomplete Democracies…cit.”.
2  S.H. BARNES, ”Perspectives on Political Action: A Review Twenty-five Years Later”, 
paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala, Sweden, 2004.
3  P. NORRIS, S. WALGRAVE, P. VAN AELST, ”Who Demonstrates: Anti-State 
Rebels, or Conventional Participants? or Everyone?”, Comparative Politics, vol. 37, no. 2, 2005, 
pp. 251-275.
4  E.M. USLANER, ”Bowling Almost Alone: Political Participation in a New Democracy”, 
paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala, Sweden, 2004.
5  R. INGLEHART, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western 
Publics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977.
6  E.M. USLANER, ”Bowling Almost Alone…cit.”.
7  P. NORRIS, ”Young People and Political Activism: From the Politics of Loyalties to the 
Politics of Choice? Report for the Council of Europe Symposium Young People and Democratic 
Institutions: From Disillusionment to Participation”, Strasbourg, France, 2003; T. O’TOOLE, 
”Engaging with Young People’s Conceptions of the Political”, Children’s Geographies, vol. 1, 
no. 1, 2003, pp. 71-90.
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joining in boycotts and attending lawful demonstrations. We build a protest indicator 
by adding the three items (Crombach’s Alpha = 0,9370).
When we measure the importance of social capital for democracy, it may prove 
that other factors to be much more important. We take here into account three series 
of factors, which are civic attitudes, economic resources and human capital. The first 
of these factors are civic attitudes, namely the way people refer to the democratic 
political system. The two items we take into account are the importance of living 
in a democratic society and how important are the liberties guaranteed by the new 
regime through the system of protection of human rights. Whether people estimate 
that living in a democratic regime does not make the difference and that democracy 
does not offer enough guarantees for individual liberty, then we expect people to 
support undemocratic alternatives.
The second factor we take into account are economic resources. The importance of 
economic performance was already stressed out following the collapse of communism 
in Central and Eastern Europe.1 We expect that ”winners”, in terms of resources and 
opportunities, support democracy much more than ”losers” in transition. Revenue, 
household financial satisfaction and hope in a future improvement of everyday life 
represent the economic resources. Democracy should demonstrate its economic 
effectiveness, it is often stressed, and a current lack of effectiveness must be balanced 
by the hope of future improvement. Communist regimes lost any popular support 
when they proved incapable to fulfill their economic responsibilities. Workers’ strikes 
in 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1980 dissipate any remaining illusion. Communists’ capacity 
of guaranteeing human rights vanished even earlier2. Though nobody knew the 
precise moment of the collapse, everybody expected the fall of those regimes, since 
they have lost their popular legitimacy. The third factor is human capital. Support for 
democracy may be related to individuals’ characteristics, as age, sex and education, 
social status and the control one believes to have over its own life.
We now turn to the impact of factors described above on the support for 
democracy, with surprising findings regarding the significant factors for the support 
for democracy in Romania. Using an almost similar survey in Russia3, Rose and 
Weller have not found any proof that social capital was important for democracy4. 
We do not want to replicate their analysis, but we follow their model in grouping 
the variables in the analysis. We first measure the importance of civic attitudes, 
economic resources and human capital, grouped in a paradigm Rose and Weller 
define as ”classical”.
1  A. PRZEWORSKI, Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.
2  J. KORNAI, The Economics of Shortage, North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 
1980.
3  New Russia Barometer, conducted in 1998.
4  R. ROSE, C. WELLER, ”What Does Social Capital Add to Democratic Values?...cit.”.
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Table 5
Civic Attitudes, Economic Resources, Human Capital and the Support for Democracy
B S.E. Beta
Constant 0.800 0.235
Democratic governance is important 0.02 0.014 0.054
Human rights are observed in Romania -0.04 0.034 -0.045
Personal income 0.00008 0 0.089**
Satisfied with household income 0.01 0.015 0.045
Optimism with everyday life in one year 0.02 0.034 0.031
Gender (male) -0.009 0.053 -0.005
Age -0.0001 0.002 -0.004
Education 0.01 0.010 0.071*
Status -0.01 0.019 -0.032
Control over one’s life 0.006 0.013 0.018
adj. R square 0.029
Regression analysis (OLS). * p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05.
The total variance explained by the regression model that we have used is only 
2,9%. The only variables with a significant impact are the income and education, but 
their impact is rather modest. We therefore need to look for another explanation of the 
support for democracy, and this is social capital. As stated above, we include in the 
model a broader definition of the social capital, by adding the dimensions of ”diffuse 
social capital” and measures of social integration. Accepting the free-riding, claiming 
state benefits which one is not entitled to, cheating on taxes or accepting bribe in the 
course of one’s duties means accepting a selfish behavior. Another element is the 
density of profitable relationships, which enable people to handle everyday problems, 
like seeing a doctor, a lawyer, a public notary. The last element is the confidence 
people have in executive (authority) institutions (government, police, courts of justice, 
army) and in representative institutions (parliament, political parties, presidency and 
mayoralties). We differentiate social integration by using two variables, the church 
attendance and living in rural areas. Both variables are supposed to have different 
effects than living in cities, a space defined by different social interactions.
Table 6
Social Capital and the Support for Democracy
B S.E. Beta
(Constant) 1.222 0.134
Membership in voluntary associations 0.008 0.062 0.004
Social trust 0.03 0.068 0.018
Egoism 0.004 0.004 0.036
Density of profitable relationships 0.0004 0.015 0.001
Trust in authority institutions -0.01 0.015 -0.034
Trust in authority institutions 0.02 0.014 0.064
Church attendance -0.00004 0.017 0
Rural residence -0.147 0.017 -0.083**
adj. R square 0.003
Regression analysis (OLS). **p < 0,01.
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The regression model presented above has an unexpectedly low explanatory 
power for the support for democracy. The single significant effect is that of rural 
residence, but its impact is also modest. Living in rural areas could thus represent 
a different socializing context, less friendly for democracy. Considering the small 
fraction of variance explained by this model, it is easy to anticipate a small increase 
in explanatory power for the integrated regression model which takes into account 
all relevant variables, civic attitudes, economic resources, human capital, protest and 
social capital alike. The tables that follow present the integrative model of regression 
for the support for democracy.
Table 7
The Integrative Model Explaining the Support for Democracy
 
B S.E. Beta
(Constant) 0.807 0.303
Democratic governance is important 0.03 0.016 0.072**
Human rights are observed in Romania -0.07 0.038 -0.070*
Personal income 0.0001 0 0.104***
Satisfied with household income 0.007 0.016 0.022
Optimism with everyday life in one year 0.02 0.037 0.026
Gender (male) -0.01 0.058 -0.006
Age -0.0004 0.002 -0.008
Education 0.02 0.011 0.083*
Status -0.007 0.021 -0.018
Control over one’s life 0.009 0.014 0.024
Membership in voluntary associations -0.01 0.031 -0.013
Social trust -0.01 0.077 -0.007
Egoism 0.005 0.005 0.042
Density of profitable relationships -0.03 0.019 -0.062*
Trust in authority institutions -0.009 0.017 -0.024
Trust in authority institutions 0.008 0.016 0.023
Church attendance 0.001 0.019 0.002
Rural residence 0.001 0.066 -0.011
adj. R square 0.029
Regression analysis (OLS). * p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01.
Table 8
The Models Explaining the Support for Democracy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Constant)
Democratic governance is important 0.054 0.072**
Human rights are observed in Romania -0.045 -0.070*
Personal income 0.089** 0.104***
Satisfied with household income 0.045 0.022
Optimism with everyday life in one year 0.031 0.026
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Gender (male) -0.005 -0.006
Age -0.004 -0.008
Education 0.071* 0.083*
Status -0.032 -0.018
Control over one’s life 0.018 0.024
Protest 0.008 0.008
Membership in voluntary associations 0.004 -0.013
Social trust 0.018 -0.007
Egoism 0.036 0.042
Density of profitable relationships 0.001 -0.062*
Trust in authority institutions -0.034 -0.024
Trust in authority institutions 0.064 0.023
Church attendance 0 0.002
Rural residence -0.083** -0.011
adj. R square 0.029 -0.001 0.003 0.029
Regression analysis (OLS). * p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01.
Conclusions
The testing of the social capital hypothesis as an important asset for democracy 
leads to several conclusions. Despite the large emphasis on cultural factors made by 
the school of social capital, the first conclusion after analyzing the Romanian data 
is that social capital has virtually no importance for the support for democracy. We 
have already expected it when we measured solely the impact of the social capital. It 
therefore seems that social capital does not add anything to the ”classical paradigm” 
explaining the support for democracy by civic attitudes, economic resources and 
human capital taken together. The second observation resides in the difference 
between our survey results and those obtained in Russia by Rose and Weller1. The 
”classical paradigm” accounts for 22% of the variance of the support for democracy 
in Russia, but less than 3% in Romania. Whereas social capital model accounts for 
5,5% of the variance in Russia, it does not account for anything in our case. The only 
similarity resides in the rise in explanatory power of the overall model, which is 
only 1.2% in the Russian case. Yet the comparison of the two surveys is used only 
to show the importance of social capital in the two contexts. We did not intend to 
replicate the Russian analysis, but only to compare the effects of social capital. In both 
contexts, there is no proof that ”hard” elements of social capital, as membership in 
voluntary associations and even social trust, have to seriously do with the support 
for democracy. Whereas ”diffuse social capital” has almost no importance in the 
Romanian case, the elements of the diffuse social capital in the Russian survey that 
proved to be significant are the density of useful relationships, the church attendance 
and, finally, the trust in authority institutions.
Comparing the results of the two surveys helps us question the allegedly high 
importance of social capital factors for democracy. When compared to other factors 
1  Ibidem.
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it seems that social capital does not prove at all important for the citizens’ support 
for democratic governance in Romania. In fact, there is good news. The support for 
democracy is larger than previously expected and democracy does not depend on the 
fragile civil society in Romania. This was also the case in Spain after the breakdown of 
the Franco regime, where the persistently low participation in voluntary associations 
accompanied the consolidation of democracy1. In our case, the support depends 
more on civic attitudes and on the economic performance of the new regime. In this 
respect, because large shares of Eastern Europeans expect future economic conditions 
to actually improve, the support for the new regime is expected to remain stable or 
even to increase with time. Thinking that fears of communism will fade and economic 
hopes will be frustrated as times goes by, the support for democracy should remain 
positive for the foreseeable future2. In the light shed by these new findings, we do share 
authors’ optimism. Romania may not have yet a strong civil society, characterized 
by a dense network of voluntary organizations; still it does not mean that the new 
democratic regime is in great peril. New threats can be found in the undemocratic 
behavior of power elites, who are today challenged by growing social criticism3. It is 
now up to them to encourage democratic consolidation by assuming fair, responsible 
and responsive political and electoral attitudes.
1  P. MCDONOUGH, S.H. BARNES, A. LOPEZ PINA, The Cultural Dynamics of 
Democratization in Spain, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998.
2  W. MISHLER, R. ROSE, ”Trajectories of Fear and Hope. Support for Democracy in Post-
Communist Europe”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 28, no. 4, 1996, pp. 553-581.
3  Ronald F. KING, Paul E. SUM (eds.), Romania under Băsescu. Aspirations, Achievements, and 
Frustrations during His First Presidential Term, Lexington Books, Lanham, 2011; S. GHERGHINA, 
S. MIŞCOIU (eds.), Partide şi personalităţi populiste în România postcomunistă, Editura Institutul 
European, Iaşi, 2010.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Variables encoding
Social capital:
V23. Generally speaking, would you say that…
1. most people can be trusted 2. you can’t be too careful in dealing with people
98.
DK
99.
NA
recode v23: (1=1) (2=0) (98,99 = sysmiss)
I’m now going to read out a list of voluntary organizations. For each of them, 
please tell me which do you belong to as an active member, an inactive member or 
not a member of that type of organization.
Member
Active Inactive Not a member NA
V24. Religious or church organization 2 1 0 99
V25. Sports or recreation 2 1 0 99
V26. Education, arts, or cultural activities 2 1 0 99
V27. Labor unions 2 1 0 99
V28. Political parties 2 1 0 99
V29. Environmental organization 2 1 0 99
V30. Professional association 2 1 0 99
V31. Charitable organization 2 1 0 99
V32. Consumers organization 2 1 0 99
V33. Other groups 2 1 0 99
Count (v24, v25, v26, v27, v28, v29, v30, v31, v32, v33) (values to count 1, 2) 
Diffuse social capital:
Please rate each of the following statements on a scale from 1 to 10; 1 means that 
you think it can never be justified and 10 means you think it can always be justified.
Never Always DK NA
v198.
Claiming state benefits 
which you are not 
entitled to
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 98 99
v199.
Travel by bus/train 
without paying a ticket 
(free-riding)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 98 99
v200. Cheating on tax if you have the chance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 98 99
v201. Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 98 99
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Recode v198 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
Recode v199 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
Recode v200 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
Recode v201 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
Compute v198+v199+v200+v201
Do you have connections / people you know and you can rely on... Yes No NA
b51
...in case of illness, for medical consultation, treatment, 
surgery operation 1 2 9
b52 ...to the law court, notary public, lawyer 1 2 9
b53 ...to the mayor 1 2 9
b54 ...to the police 1 2 9
b55 ...for getting a loan 1 2 9
b56 ...for getting a workplace 1 2 9
b57 ...in business 1 2 9
b58 ...outside the country 1 2 9
b59 ...to the local institutions (prefecture, county council) 1 2 9
Count (b51, b52, b53, b54, b55, b56, b57, b58, b59) (value to count 1) (Crombach’s 
Alpha = 0,8967)
How much confidence do you have in A great deal
Quite a 
lot
Not very 
much Not at all DK NA
v132. The armed forces 4 3 2 1 98 99
v136. The police 4 3 2 1 98 99
v137. The law courts 4 3 2 1 98 99
v138. Government 4 3 2 1 98 99
Recode v132 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
Recode v136 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
Recode v137 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
Recode v138 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
Compute v132+v136+v137+v138
How much confidence do you have in A great deal
Quite a 
lot
Not very 
much Not at all DK NA
v139. The political parties 4 3 2 1 98 99
v140. Parliament 4 3 2 1 98 99
b13. Presidency 4 3 2 1 98 99
b14. The local mayoralty 4 3 2 1 98 99
Recode v139 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
Recode v140 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
Recode b13 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
Recode b14 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
Compute v139+v140+b13+b14
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Protest:
I’m now going to read out some different forma of protest action that people can 
take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of 
these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.
Have done Might do Would never do DK NA
V96 Signing a petition 1 2 3 98 99
V97 Joining in boycotts 1 2 3 98 99
V98 Attending lawful demonstrations 1 2 3 98 99
Recode v96: (1=1) (2,3=0) (98,99=sysmiss)
Recode v97: (1=1) (2,3=0) (98,99=sysmiss)
Recode v98: (1=1) (2,3=0) (98,99=sysmiss)
Compute v96+v97+v98
Civic attitudes:
V162. Please rate from 1 to 10 on a scale how important is for you to live in a 
country which is democratically ruled
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
Not at all important Very important
                            DK = 98 NA= 99
recode v162 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
v164. How strongly do you think human right are observed in Romania?
1. very strongly  2. strongly  3. not too strongly     4. Not at all
 98.DK  99.NA
recode v164: (1=4) (2=3) (3=2) (4=1) (98,99 = sysmiss), reverse codes
Economic resources:
V253. We would like to know which is your household income, counting the 
incomes of all members? _____________________ lei
v68. Generally speaking, how satisfied you are with the financial situation of 
your household? 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
Fully unsatisfied Fully satisfied
DK = 98 NA=99
recode v68 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
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b10. How do you estimate your living conditions will be in one year?
1. much better 2. better 3. the same 4. worse 5. much worse 8. DK 9. NA
recode b10: (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (8,9 = sysmiss), reverse codes
Human capital:
V235. Sex:   1.  Male  2. Female
recode v235: (1=1) (2=0)
V237.  Age: ______ years          99.NA
recode v237 into same variable (99 = sysmiss)
V238. What is the highest educational level that you have attained?
1. No former education
2. Incomplete primary school
3. Complete primary school
4. Incomplete gymnasium
5. Complete gymnasium
6. Secondary apprentice school
7. Secondary technical school
8. Incomplete lycée
9. Complete lycée
10. Higher secondary technical school
11. Some university level education, without degree
12. University level education – technical, engineer 
education
13. University level education, with degree
14. M.A., Ph.D.
99. NR
recode v238 into same variable (99 = sysmiss)
b30. People sometimes describe themselves as being rich or poor. How would 
you describe yourself on the following scale? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 98. DK 99. NA
poor                                                                                                    rich
recode b30 into same variable (98,99 = sysmiss)
V46.  Please use this scale where 1 means ”none at all” and 10 means ”a great 
deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the 
way your life turns out.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
Not at all A great deal
DK=98 NR=99
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Social integration:
V186. Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you 
attend religious services these days?
1. More than once a week 4. Only on special holy days 7. Never
2. Once a week 5. Once a year 98. DK
3. Once a month 6. Less often 99. NA
recode v186: (1=7) (2=6) (3=5) (4=4) (5=3) (6=2) (7=1) (98,99 = sysmiss)
Locality type:
1. Great city, over 200.000 inhabitants 4. Small town, under 30.000 inhabitants
2. Great city, 100.000-200.000 inhabitants 5. Commune
3. Town, 30.000-100.000 inhabitants 6. Village
recode ”locality type” into ”rural”: (1,2,3,4=0) (5,6=1)
